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Joseph Carens first advanced his case for open borders in 1987, and it 
has played a defining role in the normative debate on immigration ever 
since. In one of the most memorable passages, he analogizes citizenship 
regimes with feudalism:
Citizenship in Western liberal democracies is the modern equivalent of feudal 
privilege—an inherited status that greatly enhances one’s life chances. Like 
feudal birthright privilege, restrictive citizenship is hard to justify when one 
thinks about it closely.1 
Carens’s analogy highlights the unfairness implicit in being born a citizen of 
a wealthy country. Like being born into a wealthy family, citizenship acquired
in virtue of birth in the territory of, or to parents who are citizens of, wealthy 
liberal democratic states is, to borrow a phrase from Rawls, “so arbitrary 
from a moral point of view” and yet so strongly shapes our prospects in life.2 
Based on his interpretations of three leading theories of justice, Carens 
concludes “there is little justification for restricting immigration” (252). While
Carens has clarified and deepened his arguments in response to critics over 
the years, he has been unwavering in his commitment to the contention that 
1 Joseph Carens, “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders,” The Review of Politics, 
vol. 49, no. 2 (1987): p? 
2 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Belknap Press, 1971), 72.
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open borders is required by justice. So it is no surprise that his recently 
published book reiterates his case open borders:  “in principle, borders 
should generally be open and people should normally be free to leave their 
country of origin and settle in another.”3
Carens advances two main arguments for open borders:  a global 
distributive justice argument and a rights-based argument. The former starts
from the premise of the equal moral worth of all human beings and assumes 
not only that justice is global in scope but also that global justice requires 
global equality of opportunity. The rights-based argument is premised on the
claim that freedom of movement is a basic human right. Elsewhere, I argue 
that justice requires not a policy of open borders but porous borders that 
privilege those whose basic human rights are at stake, including those 
fleeing persecution and violence and the world’s poorest individuals.4 I want 
to devote this essay to developing another line of argument focused on the 
question of who has the right to control immigration into a particular country.
Carens has done more than any other political theorist or philosopher 
to develop the normative perspective of prospective migrants from within 
the liberal democratic tradition, but he has not sufficiently engaged with the 
other side of the argument. That is, what is at stake for the immigrant-
receiving country that might justify its claim to control immigration? In 
particular, he has not sufficiently explored the value of political community 
and the principle of collective self-determination. We need a broader 
3 Joseph Carens, The Ethics of Immigration (Oxford University Press, 2013), 225.
4 I discuss Carens’s arguments for open borders in my book Immigration and the Limits of 
Democracy.
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normative framework for thinking about migration that takes seriously not 
only the claims of migrants but also the claims of political community. 
This essay proceeds in three parts. First, I examine Carens’s theory of 
social membership and its connection to political community. I then discuss 
Carens’s method of “political theory from the ground up” and his 
interpretation of democratic principles. I conclude with a discussion of the 
principle of collective self-determination.
Social membership and political community
An open borders immigration policy is radically utopian so one might 
associate it with a radical cosmopolitan vision of justice. Cosmopolitans hold 
that all human beings have equal moral worth and are entitled to equal 
concern and respect. Radical cosmopolitans hold the further assumption that
particular human relationships – to family, friends, and compatriots – never 
provide independent reasons for action or suffice by themselves to generate 
special responsibilities. Responsibilities to one’s associates are justifiable 
only if they can be justified by reference to the interests of all human beings 
viewed as moral equals.5 Yet Carens explicitly distances himself from 
cosmopolitans who think “the only thing that really matters is the protection 
of human rights” (161). Instead, he allows for “membership-specific rights” 
5 See Samuel Scheffler, “Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism,” in Boundaries and Allegiances: 
Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought (Oxford University Press, 2001), pp.
115.
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to which only members of a political community are entitled in contrast to 
“general human rights” to which everyone is entitled. As he emphasizes in 
the book’s conclusion, “Indeed, one of the main messages of this book is that
it is possible to reconcile deep respect for the moral claims of belonging with 
a commitment to open borders. Particularism and universalism are not in 
such fundamental conflict as people often assume” (293). Carens is a 
moderate cosmopolitan who allows for open borders and belonging, 
universalism and particularism about moral responsibility. 
Carens’s particularism is reflected in his theory of social membership, 
which serves as the grounds for many of the claims he makes in the first part
of the book for the inclusion of immigrants. The theory consists of both 
factual and normative claims. As a factual matter, it “evokes the sense that 
being a member of society involves a dense network of relationships and 
associations” (164). It is “something that applies to everyone living in a 
society, whether they can trace their ancestry back several generations or 
not” (168). Social membership is not based on ancestry or identity but on 
residence and time spent living in a place. As a normative matter, it serves 
as the basis for claiming membership-specific rights. It is “normatively prior 
to” and “more fundamental” than citizenship in the sense that it “provides 
the foundation upon which moral claims to citizenship normally rest” (160). 
So social membership serves as the ground for claiming citizenship and other
modes of belonging in the political community, but what grounds social 
membership itself? 
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I have to confess to uncertainty about Carens’s answer to this 
question. In explaining why social membership matters morally, he says 
what is at stake is “a person’s ability to maintain and develop a rich and 
highly particular set of human ties” (164). This sounds like a general human 
rights claim based on the basic human interest in forming and sustaining 
relationships wherever we happen to be, but Carens explicitly distinguishes 
himself from radical cosmopolitans who think that protecting human rights is
the only thing that matters. Perhaps he means to focus on the significance of
the actual location of our richest relationships. As Carens puts it, “Most 
people do develop deep and rich networks of relationships in the place 
where they live, and this normal pattern of human life is what makes sense 
of the idea of social membership” (168, emphasis added). Yet, the place 
where we live, the sites where we develop our richest relationships, tend to 
be local settings – our homes, schools, workplaces, neighborhoods, and 
cities. 
I think Carens’s theory of social membership is grounded in a theory of 
political community. Indeed, it has to be – it is the political community, not a 
social group or network, to which immigrants seek inclusion in the range of 
cases Carens discusses in the first part of the book. His theory of social 
membership presupposes the value and moral relevance of the political 
community. We need to know more about Carens’s conception of political 
community to understand why we should give moral weight to an 
immigrant’s claims of membership and belonging to it. What is special about 
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the relationship among members of a political community as opposed to 
other kinds of community? There are at least two distinctive features of the 
relationship among members of a political community:  it is typically not 
voluntary and it involves shared subjection to the coercive power of the 
state. These two features raise the familiar question of the legitimacy of 
political authority. Linking the question of political legitimacy to Carens’s 
discussion of immigration gives us a way to justify political community as the
ground of social membership:  it is not only that noncitizen migrants have 
“rich networks of relationships in the place where they live” (social 
membership claim) but also that they are subject to the coercive power of 
the state under which they live (political legitimacy claim).6 Linking social 
membership and political community in this way provides a more convincing 
basis for the claims of migrants that Carens argues for in the first part of the 
book – the claims are addressed to and owed by the political communities 
where they live. 
Interpreting democratic principles
The method Carens adopts in the first part of the book reminds me of 
the approach Michael Walzer takes in his 1983 book, Spheres of Justice. 
Walzer’s way of doing philosophy was not to seek “an objective and 
universal standpoint” but “to interpret to one’s fellow citizens the world of 
6 See Sarah Song, “The Significance of Territorial Presence and the Rights of Immigrants,” in 
Migration in Political Theory: The Ethics of Movement and Membership, eds. Sarah Fine and 
Lea Ypi (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
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meanings that we share.”7 Similarly, Carens looks to our shared 
understandings of “democratic principles” that are reflected in 
“contemporary political institutions and policies throughout North America 
and Europe” (2). He provides some examples of democratic principles, 
including “that all human beings are of equal moral worth, that 
disagreements should normally be resolved through the principle of majority 
rule, that we have a duty to respect the rights and freedoms of individuals, 
that legitimate government depends upon consent of the governed, that all 
citizens should be equal under the law, that coercion should only be 
exercised in accordance with the rule of law, that people should not be 
subject to discrimination on the basis of characteristics like race, religion, or 
gender” (2). 
As Carens’s list suggests, the content of “democratic principles” in 
North America and Western Europe is rich and pluralistic. It is also contested 
and conflicting. He says these core principles could be called “liberal” or 
“liberal democratic” or “republican” instead of “democratic, but Carens relies
more on certain principles over others in the course of his book. In particular,
the principles of moral equality and individual rights and freedoms serve as 
important premises in his arguments for the inclusion of noncitizens in the 
first part of the book and in his case for open borders in the second part. This
emphasis reflects Carens’ underlying endorsement of liberal commitments 
7 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (Basic Books, 
1983), xiv.
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over certain core democratic principles, such as political equality and 
collective self-determination. 
The principle of collective self-determination
The principle of self-determination is a fundamental democratic 
principle that plays a minor role in Carens’s book. He briefly discusses the 
idea but what he says is conflicting. In the introduction, he says “it may be 
plausible to argue, from a moral perspective, that states should enjoy wide 
latitude in setting their immigration and citizenship policies” (8), but then he 
argues that “discretionary control over immigration is incompatible with 
fundamental democratic principles” (10). Toward the end of the book, after 
analyzing different arguments against open borders, Carens concludes: 
there are no compelling arguments against open borders at the level of 
principle. There are some contingent and self-limiting arguments that justify 
restrictions on immigration under certain circumstances but no arguments 
that justify the discretionary control over immigration that states now exercise
and that the conventional view endorses (287). 
Here Carens elides two questions that need to be distinguished. The first is 
about the content of immigration policy:  what sort of immigration policy 
does justice require? His answer is open borders. The other question is 
whether the state’s control over immigration can be justified. His considered 
answer seems to be no. Perhaps part of why Carens rejects the possibility of 
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any compelling justification for the state’s right to control immigration is 
because he views it as an absolute right. If we concede that the state has the
right, what is to stop them from exercising absolute control? But an absolute 
right to control or no right at all are not the only options. 
I believe a compelling argument can be developed for the political 
community’s pro tanto right to control immigration, based on the idea of 
collective self-determination. In contrast to conclusory reasons for action, 
which require us to act regardless of other considerations in play, pro tanto 
reasons are “genuine reasons for action,” but they do not necessarily 
override competing reasons that may also be in play.8 So, to say I have the 
right of freedom of movement is not to say I have an absolute right of free 
movement. For example, my freedom to move about typically stops at the 
tip of your nose and the border of your private land, unless I can make the 
case that there is a basic human interest that will be served by my 
interfering with your body or property. Similarly, to say that the state has a 
pro tanto right to control immigration recognizes it has genuine and 
compelling reasons for controlling immigration, but they must be weighed 
against competing considerations. I will say more about this below. 
What grounds the state’s right to control immigration is the right of 
collective self-determination. If we apply Carens’s “ground up” method to 
this principle, we find that it is a fundamental principle reflected in UN 
charters and covenants. The first article of the UN Charter, signed in 1945, 
8 Charles R. Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford Universtiy Press, 2009), 116-7.
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declares self-determination to be a fundamental right of all peoples.9 The 
idea of a universal right of self-determination is further enunciated in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:  “All peoples have the 
right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.”10 Collective self-determination has an internal and external 
dimension. Internally, collective self-determination is the idea of popular 
sovereignty – that a group of people ought to have independent political 
control over significant aspects of its common life. We can find its external 
dimension expressed in international law where it used to be viewed as 
applying only to specific territories – first, the defeated European powers and
later, the overseas trust territories and colonies – and it was understood 
primarily as a right of secession. The idea of collective self-determination has
evolved in international law to be understood as a right of all peoples to 
participate in processes of collective governance.11 
What grounds the principle of self-determination itself? One strategy of
justification begins with the premise that is central to Carens’s case for open 
borders – the moral equality of persons – and seeks to derive the value of 
collective self-determination from it. This strategy anticipates the objection 
that collective self-determination is inherently incompatible with respecting 
human rights and responds that self-determination can be derived from the 
9 Charter of the United Nations, Article 1, June 26, 1945.
10 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966.
11 Thomas M. Franck, “Emerging Right to Democratic Governance,” American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 86 (1992), 54-5.
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premise that all persons qua persons should be treated with equal concern 
and respect. This approach is rooted in value individualism:  that individual 
human beings have intrinsic value and that collective entities like the state 
derive their value from their contributions to the lives of individuals. One 
might argue that the right of self-determination should be added to the list of
basic human rights on the grounds that it is required to respect the moral 
equality of persons, for one of two reasons. The first is offered by proponents
of a human right to democracy:  respecting the moral equality of persons 
requires recognizing a right to democratic self-governance. The claim here is
that moral equality requires that all persons be regarded as equal 
participants in significant political decisions to which they are subject. A 
second reason starts from the premise of the moral equality of all persons 
but offers an instrumental argument for recognizing a legal right to 
democracy in international law:  democratic governance is so instrumentally 
valuable for the protection of human rights that it ought to be required for 
any government to be considered legitimate.
While I share the value individualism underlying these moral equality 
arguments, they fail to capture something fundamental about the right of 
self-determination:  it is an irreducibly collective right. The right of self-
determination is irreducibly collective in at least two senses. First, the agent 
is a collective agent – “we the people” – that is not reducible to the mere 
aggregation of individual members of a political community. Second, the 
freedom of self-determination is a collective freedom. This is what Rousseau 
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called “moral liberty” or “obedience to the law one has prescribed for 
oneself.” Moral liberty “alone makes man truly the master of himself” and it 
is only possible “in the civil state.”12 Rousseau adds another dimension to our
understanding of the value of political community:  it is only through political
community that collective self-determination is possible. The challenge is to 
provide an account of the relationship of the collective and its individual 
members such that we can say we have a collective agent that also respects 
the freedom and equality of individuals.13 
My point here is that there is a compelling argument for the state’s pro
tanto right to control immigration that is based on the principle of collective 
self-determination. Recognizing such a right is not to say that there should 
be ‘closed borders’ instead of ‘open borders’ but rather that members of the 
political community have the right to shape the terms of membership and 
belonging within constraints, which are themselves defined by democratic 
principles. We can appeal to the sorts of considerations that Carens himself 
raises in the first part of the book to develop an account of the constraints on
state regulation of borders. In contrast with Carens who moves in the second
part of his book to reject the presupposition of legitimate state control over 
immigration, I think we can defend the state’s right to control immigration 
while also arguing that the right should exercised in ways that allow for the 
admission of refugees and others fleeing violence and war, family 
12 Rousseau, Social Contract, Book I, Chapter VIII, 151.
13 I draw on Rousseau to address this challenge in Sarah Song, Immigration and the Limits of
Democracy.
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reunification policies, the legalization of irregular migrants, and other policies
that Carens defends in the first part of the book.
I greatly admire the clarity, rigor, and wide-ranging scope of Carens’s 
book. And given how controversial and complicated a topic immigration is, I 
also admire how he wrote the book not only for a scholarly audience but also
for “ordinary men and women in North America and Europe who think of 
themselves as people who believe in democracy and individual rights and 
who want to understand the challenges posed by immigration into their 
societies” (3). I think the first part of Carens’s book is a model of democratic 
persuasion. In addressing ordinary men and women in North America and 
Europe, he implicitly accords a kind of standing to ‘we the people’ in 
democratic political communities as having the power to shape the future of 
their communities. If we take seriously the principle of collective self-
determination, we are able to see that this power is not merely a convention 
but a legitimate power of ‘we the people.’ 
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